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Playing at Serial 
Acquisitions
Han Smit
Thras Moraitis
O ver just a few years in the early 2000s, then-CEO Chris Gent grew Vodafone from a small UK-based mobile operator into the world leader, with over 240 million customers. He did this via a sequence of 26 strategic equity transactions, including the 
acquisition of AirTouch and transactions leading to the creation of the Verizon 
wireless business in the U.S.; a bitter takeover battle for Germany’s Mannes-
mann; and many Asian alliances such as China Mobile link.
Today’s economy is characterized by uncertainty, globalization, and the 
rapid emergence of significant new markets (most notably in China and India) 
with significant consumer bases, skills, and low-cost production capacity. The 
need for increased efficiency in such an environment makes Vodafone’s global 
acquisition strategy enviable. Management teams typically envision a series of 
transactions based on buy-and-build principles, in which they initially acquire a 
“platform” in a new geography and then leverage their newly acquired compe-
tencies and assets into follow-on acquisitions over a wider geographic and cus-
tomer base.
Looking at Vodafone’s acquisition story, Chris Gent played his cards well, 
while rivals and financial markets acted irrationally in some instances. Using 
Vodafone’s shares as a currency for its acquisitions, Gent created a successful 
global telecoms brand while some of Vodafone’s rivals, failing to see the strate-
gic value of acquisitions, remained imprudently conservative. However, even 
Gent may have made some serial acquisition errors on the road to building the 
world’s leading telecoms company. He was sometimes accused of hubris and 
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some of Vodafone’s acquisitions were thought to be overpriced by the financial 
market community at the time.
However, executing a successful global acquisition strategy without mak-
ing risky decisions is a difficult task—in the real and uncertain competitive 
world, macroeconomic change or competitor preemption may render appar-
ently realistic targets unavailable or unattractively expensive. All management 
teams face the same basic dilemmas when making decisions: on the one hand, 
any target carries the risk of overpayment, which may be founded on uncon-
scious irrational justifications, such as an 
over-optimistic expectation of synergies or 
growth opportunities, or becoming trapped 
in an escalating bidding contest. On the 
other hand, in consolidating industries in 
particular, opportunities are limited and a 
missed chance is a very real threat. Under-
bidding—failing to pay the price required 
to secure a critical target—may result from “framing” the opportunity in isola-
tion by failing to recognize new growth options and to fully appreciate the value 
of a target as part of a larger consolidation strategy. The imperative to select 
appropriate targets and then execute the relevant transactions successfully is far 
greater in a serial acquisition strategy context, where failure at one step of the 
process could cause the strategy to stall or to break down later on.
This kind of strategic acquisition dilemma can determine the firm’s future 
success, its market value, and even—in the challenging landscape of industry 
consolidation—its very survival. Yet managers too often make these decisions 
based on intuition and experience alone, leaving them vulnerable to the pitfalls 
of cognitive biases, with little guidance from rational tools to analyze and assist 
their serial acquisition decisions.
Novel company valuation methods (such as real option game valuation) 
are a relatively new field that has been hitherto separated from behavioral litera-
ture. We argue that a structured and rational quantitative analysis, using a mod-
ified option game toolkit, could help mitigate several management biases. We 
focus on a particular tension: how cognitive biases can “infect” rational analysis 
and lead executives to manipulate—inadvertently or knowingly—their analyses 
to get the answers they expect or require. The specific advantage of the rational 
approach we propose is that it allows for adjustments to prevent such “irrational 
infection” of the rational analysis of valuation.
Six Potential Pitfalls in the Execution 
of a Serial Acquisition Strategy
Fragmented industries are increasingly becoming consolidated, either 
pro-cyclically (to take advantage of favorable investment opportunities or in the 
pursuit of scale and diversification, as in telecoms or mining) or counter-cycli-
cally (driven by the need for efficiency, as in banking, airlines, or car manufac-
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turing). Arguments based on efficiency and market power, the rise of the BRIC 
economies, and the global integration of financial and product flows are creating 
an imperative for globalization in mining, banking, airlines, and steel.
What the strategies of Vodafone, Xstrata (mining), or Arcelor Mittal 
(steel) have in common is that they are the serial execution of transactions in 
pursuit of an external accumulation of assets. They adhere to traditional buy-
and-build principles, in which an investor initially acquires one or more plat-
forms and then leverages their newly acquired core competencies and assets 
onto follow-on acquisitions over a wider geographic, product, or customer base.
The strategy pursued by Vodafone during the early 2000s was a clas-
sic example of global consolidation. After a successful marketing campaign had 
secured it a dominant position in its UK home market, its acquisitions in the 
U.S., Europe, China, and Japan gave it a platform to create a global telecom 
brand. Vodafone gained a strong position in the U.S. when it outbid Bell Atlantic 
to buy AirTouch for $62 billion in January 1999. The merger created one of the 
world’s largest international mobile telecoms companies, with an extensive pres-
ence that covered most of Europe and the United States. Vodafone considered a 
number of subsequent options in the U.S., including making a move to combine 
the U.S. mobile phone interests of Vodafone AirTouch and Bell Atlantic.1
In 2000, the company strengthened its position in Europe when it 
launched a $205 billion hostile bid for Germany’s Mannesmann telecoms group 
in a battle that remains one of the largest hostile takeovers in history. This move 
secured its place as a key European operator, and it created further acquisition 
opportunities in a European mobile market that was fragmented but rapidly 
beginning to consolidate.
In China, Vodafone made a strategic alliance with China Mobile with 
an investment of $2.5 billion in October 2000, which gave it a foothold in the 
world’s largest mobile market, while China Mobile gained access to Vodafone’s 
marketing and technical expertise, particularly in third-generation mobile tech-
nology. Meanwhile the group’s initial investment in Japan followed from the 
merger with AirTouch, and comprised taking equity stakes in nine regional 
mobile telecoms companies. This created the option for further investment, 
which led to J-Phone Vodafone and the acquisition of Japan Telecom. Vodafone 
has also recently acquired Alltel Corp for $28 billion.
However, when a serial acquisition vision overrides rational analysis, it 
may be vulnerable to cognitive drawbacks that can undermine objective decision 
making. Extensive psychological experimental studies suggest that there are gen-
eral human biases in decision making that appear to affect decisions in predict-
able ways.2 Serial acquirers should try to mitigate the biases of their boards that 
may be responsible for suboptimal acquisition decisions and also try to antici-
pate—rationally—that their rivals, financial analysts, or investors can sometimes 
act in ways that can be predictably irrational. There are pitfalls that can manifest 
themselves in a biased strategy,3 in overheated contests for platform targets, or 
in the overvaluation of targets.
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Potential Pitfalls in Serial Acquisition Strategy
Pitfall 1:
Overinvestment or Over-Conservatism in Consolidating Industries
Acquisitions are surrounded by uncertainty, and how they are described 
or framed is likely to affect the way executives perceive the levels of risk 
involved.4 Aversion to losses is a central feature of Kahneman and Tversky’s 
prospect theory (a descriptive theory, based on extensive experimental evidence) 
of how people evaluate risk.5 Decisions are determined by gains and losses mea-
sured relative to a reference point. Loss aversion—meaning that people are more 
sensitive to the possibility of losses than to gains of the same magnitude—may lead 
executives to behave in a way that is suboptimal from the shareholder perspec-
tive. Confronted with acquisition decisions in a consolidating industry, execu-
tives may exhibit aversion to a certain loss and narrow framing.
A CEO may tend to avoid taking a “certain loss” by refusing to aban-
don bidding contests or to divest assets. For instance, Vodafone was accused of 
excessive bidding in repeatedly raising its bid (up to a 70% premium) to win its 
hostile takeover battle against Mannesmann’s management. Similarly, when a 
market entry decision is considered at a loss relative to a reference point—for 
instance, where the price to be paid for a platform acquisition exceeds its stand-
alone value—management may choose to continue making risky investments in 
an unattractive region hoping to gamble their way out, rather than to divest the 
platform at a lower but certain loss.
A CEO may also look at a strategic platform acquisition in too narrow a 
way. Experimental evidence shows that when people are offered a new gamble, 
they tend to evaluate it in isolation, separately from other risks.6 This tendency 
is called “narrow framing” and can occur in platform acquisitions in particular, 
because the payoff distribution of an investment is much easier to understand 
in isolation than it is in the overall context of a serial acquisition strategy that 
involves interdependent follow-on investments and/or acquisitions in other 
regions. Thus, a company considering a platform acquisition as a one-shot deal 
will tend to underestimate its importance and behave too conservatively, risk-
ing undermining its strategic position. Clearly, too-narrow framing was one bias 
that did not affect Chris Gent: while Vodafone was capturing its leading position, 
some of its rivals remained conservative, unable to appreciate the new growth 
opportunities. However, Vodafone was clearly not in conservative mode and 
framed its strategy much more broadly, targeting multiple or parallel platform 
acquisitions in the U.S., Europe, China, and Japan to position itself to be able to 
make follow-on asset acquisitions across multiple geographies.
In summary, aversion to certain losses and too-narrow framing may result 
in an overly static acquisition strategy that will result in sub-optimal growth in 
shareholder wealth. However, while narrow framing may result in a too-con-
servative acquisition strategy that fails to fully utilize upward potential, aversion 
to sure losses can lead to a consolidator overinvesting, increasing his losses by 
continuing to invest when the market signals indicate otherwise—in essence, 
throwing good money after bad.
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Pitfall 2: 
Judgment Biases Result in Overinvestment in an Acquisition Strategy
While the first strategy pitfall can result from the way executives perceive
risk, Pitfall 2 results from the way they estimate risk and other critical factors. A 
management team may envision a well-crafted long-term consolidating strategy 
that involves the selection of a series of targets to secure its strategic position and 
to capitalize on—or even catalyze—industry consolidation. However, judgment 
biases reinforced by groupthink and disregard for warning signals can mean that 
the strategy they envision is based on overly optimistic expectations of synergies 
and the illusion of control over the targets.7
One such judgment bias that CEOs may face, and which can result in 
unrealistic entries, is overconfidence.8 Experimental evidence has shown that peo-
ple tend to be overconfident, and this factor can be particularly true—and par-
ticularly tempting—in the kind of environment that typically surrounds highly 
successful executives who may have already executed a string of value-accretive 
transactions.9 Such managerial hubris—the unrealistic belief held by bidding 
managers that they can manage the assets of a target firm more efficiently than 
its current managers—goes hand in hand with excessively optimistic expectations.10
In the same way that behavioral corporate finance studies show that start-up 
entrepreneurs usually have overly optimistic views of their ventures’ potential 
for success,11 executives involved in serial acquisition strategies can overestimate 
their company’s ability to appropriate a target and thus overvalue its growth 
potential.12
This kind of bias in a serial strategy may be path-dependent, since the 
acquiring company’s past successes (or recent media praise for its CEO) can 
increase the risk of overconfidence.13 Thus, previous successful acquisition 
efforts can introduce an overly optimistic view about the achievability of follow-
on targets and can increase the danger of managers trying to take the company a 
“bridge too far.” Table 1 provides an overview of simple boardroom experiments 
that reveal senior executives’ sensitivity to cognitive drawbacks that may intro-
duce judgmental biases affecting their ability to rationally perceive their acquisi-
tion strategy. While experiments such as “Feeling Confident?”14 ought to cause 
executives to look again at the rationality of their own belief in their abilities, it 
is worth remembering that overconfidence is a general self-serving human bias, 
and one that, sadly, appears to be only minimally affected by feedback.
In particular groupthink and team decisions tend to accentuate the risk of 
unwarranted confidence in the acquisition decision. Team groupthink can sup-
port the underestimation of the risks involved and so lead to the illusion of con-
trol. CEOs and top management teams often (sometimes unconsciously) credit 
their own actions when they succeed, but blame “bad luck” when they fail.
A related judgment bias in strategy design lies in a subconscious resistance 
to critically testing hypotheses. Seeing only what we want to see is labeled confir-
mation bias: experiments show we tend to seek confirmatory data and opinions, 
which leads on to systematic overconfidence in favored hypotheses. This type of 
general bias—investing more energy into looking for evidence that supports a 
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hypothesis than into seeking signals that might contradict it—is revealed in the 
“Confirmed!” card experiment described in Table 1.15 Confirmation and over-
confidence in strategy can also partly result from (or be reinforced by) other 
biases, such as groupthink. Group processes are sensitive to joint confirmation bias:
imagine a group of executives and their consultants evaluating whether a post-
acquisition integration would realize the synergies they expected when they bid 
for the acquisition. Just as in the experiment in Table 1 participants choose cards 
that support (rather than contradict) their hypothesis, executives—supported by 
their business development teams, consultants, and investment bankers (who 
are, after all, incentivized to complete, rather than abort, transactions)—rarely 
seek or are presented with data that contradict a transaction’s value proposition.
Where significant decisions that can materially affect the value of the 
organization are to be taken, the benefits of looking for potentially contra-indic-
atory evidence are clear. Nevertheless, executives often persist instead in seek-
ing yet more confirmation, which does not necessarily provide new information 
value.16
Potential Bidding Pitfalls
Even if the above-mentioned obstacles to their acquisition strategies have 
been successfully negotiated, executives face another challenge to successful 
execution: the bidding contest, which appears in its starkest form in bidding auc-
tions and bidding wars. As noted above, Vodafone fought several takeover bat-
tles in what was a rapidly consolidating industry. Auctions are seen as efficient 
ways to match bidders and targets—smooth-running, swift, and fair. However, 
when they are structured over several rounds but with limited time for advisors 
to plough through information in data rooms (as is common in private equity 
auctions and privatizations) the threat that bidders can become overcommitted 
is increased. This process is similar in competitive bid situations for public com-
panies: in either case, the costs—financial, emotional, and reputational—will 
escalate as the process unfolds.
Pitfall 3:
Entrapment in an Escalating Bidding Contest
Consider the classic thought experiment “War of Attrition” (described in 
Table 2) that shows how two rivals engaged in a bidding war can end up paying 
much more than the object is worth to justify their initial bidding expenses, a 
tendency that is exacerbated by the competitive instinct typical for behavior in 
an auction.
Irrational escalation of commitment (commitment bias) reflects the choices 
of decision makers who are unwilling to admit that they were mistaken to have 
gone this far in the first place. Decision makers can too often persist in bidding 
even after the price exceeds the target value, simply to justify the actions that 
they have already taken. This often arises in situations in which the bidding 
process is costly, but there still appears to be a possibility of achieving better 
outcomes by continuing to bid. As noted, Vodafone had to outbid Bell Atlantic 
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to buy AirTouch for $62 billion and was also forced to pay a substantial (70%) 
premium over the prevailing market price to win its hostile takeover battle for 
Mannesmann.
Entering a bidding contest is costly—bidders have to pay fees to their 
bankers, legal advisors, and consultants, whose reputations will often be as 
much on the line as those of the focal company and its executives. Executives 
Pitfall Bias/
Heuristic Board Room Experiment
Pitfall 2. 
Judgment
Cognitive 
Biases:
overconfidence, 
overoptimism, 
illusion of 
control, and 
confirmation 
bias to a 
business model 
enforced by 
board room 
group think 
Experiment: “Feeling confident?”
“Rank your driving skills (on a scale of 1 to 5) compared to the average in this group (=3)”
Subjects are asked to write down in a sealed envelope their estimate of their competence 
as drivers in relation to the group. When the average result is calculated it is almost invariably 
greater than 3, a statistical impossibility. The majority of subjects regarded themselves as more 
skilful and less prone to taking risks than the average driver in the group.
Experiment: “Confirmed!”
Four double-sided cards are laid out on the table, each with a number on one side and 
a letter on the other. Suppose that we can see only the upper face of the four cards, as 
shown below. “Which pair would you choose given the opportunity to flip over just two cards to 
test the assertion: If a card has a vowel on one side, then there must be an even number on the 
other side?”
Problem E 2 C 3
Response 1 4 K   
Response 2 4    A
The most common response to the question (Response 1) is the combination of the “E” and 
“2” cards. “E” confirms the statement by having “4” on its reverse (an uneven number would 
refute the statement). However, turning over the 2 does not provide new information. A 
consonant (e.g., “K”), on the other side would not actually say anything about the statement, 
while a vowel would appear to confirm the statement, but could not make it necessarily true 
for all the cards. So turning the “2” over cannot test the assertion. The correct answer in this 
experiment is Response 2: the combination of “E” and “3”. Turing over the “3” choice could
prove that the statement is false if the other side reveals a vowel (as it does: i.e. A). This is 
a simple example of actively seeking data that could contradict a hypothesis or assertion. Not 
reading the statement carefully enough – in fact, reading an unjustified assumption into it—
participants tend to choose the “E” and “2” cards because they see them as being capable of 
providing evidence that confirms the assertion. They tend not to choose the “3”, even though 
it is the only one that could disprove the statement.
TABLE 1. Biases that Affect Company Strategy
Note: There are three categories of psychological pitfall that may cause suboptimal serial acquisition strategy: biases, heuristics and framing 
effects.
• A bias is a predisposition to an error of some type.
• A heuristic or a rule of thumb, based on experience, industry standards or academic constructs. It is not uncommon for managers to rely on 
heuristics in their valuation of targets, but their unquestioned use as substitutes for rigorous fundamental analysis may affect optimal decision 
making.
• Framing concerns the way the decision is described, and often influences executives’ decisions.
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hate to admit that their past investments were ineffective, and what better way 
to reaffirm the value of their earlier acquisitions than by becoming even more 
committed to them through further investments? Group dynamics also play a 
role. Executive teams and even boards become invested in the bid process, creat-
ing rationales to show why walking away would cost more in terms of reputa-
tion, momentum, loss of key skills, or even share price pressure. Pressure from 
their bankers can often reinforce such group logics for pressing on—“one more 
Description of Human Biases that Affect 
Strategy Decision Making
Behavioral researchers have identified a tendency to 
consider ourselves “better than average” on positive 
characteristics. This may be lead executives be overoptimistic 
about their assessments of integration plans, their ability to 
appropriate targets and about scenarios to realize synergies, 
and thus to overvalue targets. This overconfidence goes hand 
in hand with overoptimism and illusions of control, where 
uncertainty in extraneous factors or strategic uncertainty is 
underestimated.
These tendencies tend to lead to systematic executive 
overconfidence in an acquisition situation, resulting in them 
selecting evidence that confirms the next transaction. 
Actively seeking and evaluating disconfirming information and 
factoring such data into their calculations, would minimize 
the risk of confirmation bias. Group think situations can lead 
to collective overconfidence reinforcing the unwarranted 
acceptance of confirmatory evidence and disregard for any 
contradictions, as well as to the danger of boards becoming 
polarized.
Executives (and their advisors) should be careful not to 
overestimate their judgment capabilities, to overvalue targets 
or be overoptimistic about plans and scenarios to realize 
synergies. They should recognize that a major acquisition in a 
consolidating sector is likely to invite a competitive response 
from rival consolidators who do not want to be left in the 
cold when the industry’s “musical chairs” reaches its end-
game. A realistic view of the chance of appropriating the 
target must be taken by the executive team – considering 
all factors such as the ownership structure, management’s 
perspective, the investment community’s expectations and 
competition, and all the available evidence, positive and 
negative. If targets seem to be unattainable, executive teams 
should not pursue them, and recognize that this is the right 
decision.
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price increase will do it”—to the point of ignoring dissenting voices or contra-
indicating data.
This kind of escalation is, at least in part, related to the sunk cost fallacy—a
phenomenon where increased investments are made mainly to justify cumula-
tive prior decisions, even in the face of new evidence suggesting that the original 
decisions were probably wrong. When previous transactions along the serial 
acquisition path were justified on the basis of future transactions, it becomes 
even more difficult for a team to later back off from one of those future transac-
tions, considering they have “come this far along the road” in their serial acqui-
sition strategy.
Pitfall Bias/
Heuristic Board Room Experiment 
Description of Human 
Biases that Affect 
Bidding 
Pitfall 3.
Escalated
Commitment
Experiment: “War of Attrition”
A £5 note is auctioned between two rivals in an 
English (i.e. ascending price) auction. Bids increase 
by £1 per round until one bidder gives up and the 
other wins the £5 note. However, in this format the 
loser and the winner still both pay their highest bid.
In practice, the winning bid often exceeds £5, since 
neither rival wants to give up and pay their bid 
unnecessarily. The above example is in some sense 
similar to a company auction, with advisory fees and 
other sunk costs.
Escalation reflects the decision 
makers’ unwillingness to admit 
they were mistaken to go this far 
in the first place. It often arises 
in situations in which the bidding 
process is costly, but there seems 
to be a possibility of achieving 
a better outcome by bidding 
further. Bidders should ignore the 
impact of prior investments if they 
are sunk.
The situation resembles waiting 
for a friend – if you have already 
invested 15 minutes, you are more 
likely to invest another 5 – if you 
have already invested an hour, you 
are more likely to invest another 15 
minutes.
Pitfall 4.
Winner’s Curse
(can result 
from bias and 
information 
asymmetry)
Thought Experiment: “The Winner’s Curse”
An undisclosed amount of small change in a wallet 
(taken randomly from a group member) is auctioned 
among the group. Bids are sealed and the highest 
wins the unknown amount.
“What would you bid for an asset with an unknown 
value?”
Participants will want to bid a margin below their 
estimate (which is inevitably uncertain, and made 
on guesswork rather than evidence) to allow for 
profit, but high enough to win the auction. However 
the dynamic created by the combination of the 
uncertain value and selection of the highest bid 
often results in the winner being the bidder who 
most overestimates the target’s value – which they 
subsequently regret.
When the value of the asset 
being auctioned is uncertain, the 
winner is likely to overestimate 
its worth and bid too high. Even 
relying on a good valuation 
method can leave some 
uncertainty. A rational bidder 
should submit a bid at a price that 
is lower than their uncertain value 
estimate – and the less accurate 
the valuation, the lower the bid 
should be. 
The main lesson is the 
importance of gathering as much 
information as possible about the 
true fundamental value of the 
assets being sold.
TABLE 2. Biases that Affect Bidding
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In a serial acquisition strategy, the premium paid for a platform acquisi-
tion that can be viewed as a precursor to the current target can also be seen as 
a “sunk cost”—thus acting as a further incentive to overpay once more. Worse 
still, powerful arguments can be made that the entire serial acquisition strategy 
will stall or even fail unless the current target is acquired at all costs. Previous 
expenditures—such as on due diligence, consultancy, financing, or even on a 
previous high premium platform acquisition—should never be used as arguments 
by themselves to continue bidding. They should be ignored, unless their nature 
and any associated learning provide real insights into whether it makes sense to 
continue.
Pitfall 4: 
The “Winner’s Curse”—Successful Bidding on Inaccurate Information
However, bidders in auctions are not only vulnerable due to irrationally 
escalated bidding: inaccurate information can also lead auction bids to exceed 
the value of the acquisition. At the time of Vodafone’s expansion, the winner’s 
curse was quite common in the telecoms industry, in auctions for licenses and 
bidding contests for acquisitions.17
When several bidders contemplate the acquisition of the same target com-
pany, they may not know the target’s exact value when they bid. Where “good” 
information as to the target’s value is difficult to come by, or just uncertain, bid-
ders are obliged to fall back on trying to estimate its value independently. When 
the company is worth (roughly) the same to all bidders, the only thing that 
distinguishes them will be their respective valuation estimates. The winner will 
thus be the one that makes the highest estimate. If, in fact, the average bid is accu-
rate, then the highest bidder will have overestimated the target’s value, so (by 
definition) the winner is likely to have overpaid—the winner’s curse.
Consider a simple numerical example of two different companies being 
auctioned. One with a well-defined value deriving from ascertainable cash 
flows (A) and the other (B) with an uncertain value based on growth options. 
Suppose the value of company A is $2 billion: as this value is known, bidders 
will bid just under that level—high enough to outbid rival bidders, low enough 
to leave the transaction profitable. The range of bids will, therefore, be quite 
restricted, since they will be based on “good” information.
However, in the company B case, where the asset is of (comparatively) 
unknown value, the increased uncertainty implies a much wider distribution of 
bids, since they are all based (more or less entirely) on estimates. Suppose the 
bids vary from $1 billion to $3 billion, with an average, measured by the mean 
of their distribution, of $2 billion (incidentally, the same as for Company A). 
As the auction rules ensure both companies are sold to the highest bidders, it is 
likely that company A’s acquirer will have paid somewhat less than $2 billion. 
However, the acquirer of the uncertain target B is the one that most overestimated its 
value—this “cursed” winner will pay $3 billion.
Imagine now the auctioning of an item of uncertain value when some 
bidders know more about the item than others—i.e., a situation of informa-
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tion asymmetry. Anyone who has bought antiques at an auction will know the 
unpleasant feeling that creeps up on you when you have just outbid a profes-
sional trader or collector. They know more than you—you have almost certainly 
paid too much. Bidders who fail to take the possibility of information asymmetry 
into account are even more likely to fall afoul of the winner’s curse.
A situation that illustrates the winner’s curse of “hard to value assets” was 
the 2000–2001 auction of 62 UMTS (3G) licenses in the European telecoms mar-
ket, which realized a total of `109 billion. Operators trying to consolidate their 
pan-European markets needed footholds in four key markets: France, Italy, Ger-
many, and the UK. Buying several licenses sequentially would give them econo-
mies of scope and scale that would result in stronger strategic positions. The UK 
3G network license, therefore, represented a platform investment, and the high 
prices paid in this auction partly reflected the extra value that was expected to 
result from follow-on investments in later auctions. The winners would ben-
efit from a full-scale expansion, while those less successful would have a more 
restricted set of future opportunities. However, like the auctioning of many 
assets with elusive value, the sale led to a winner’s curse. Market misperceptions 
of the value of these licenses were amplified by operators’ overconfidence in 
their abilities to increase scale, and this cumulative overvaluation caused even 
the average bid to be higher than the true value, further increasing the winning 
bid and the burden of the winner’s curse. A fundamental (e.g., real option) valu-
ation could have resulted in a clearer view of the worth of the optionality, while 
at the same time incorporating uncertainty into the value estimation model.
Even when a good valuation method is available, uncertainty will remain. 
A rational bidder should take account of the danger of the winner’s curse and 
submit a bid that is lower than the value estimate; and the more uncertain the 
valuation, the lower the bid should be.18 A seller should recognize that bidders’ 
awareness of the winner’s curse may lead them to bid more cautiously. Indeed, 
sellers at private equity auctions can be observed doing everything they can to 
limit uncertainty for buyers, e.g., by providing strategy reports from consultants 
and approved leverage from financiers.
It is crucial to make every effort to improve information about a target, certainly to a level 
higher than that of other bidders.
Potential Valuation Pitfalls
In addition to the pitfalls in the strategy and bidding processes, the assess-
ment of value by the executive team (or by the financial market community at 
large) can provide yet another pitfall for companies seeking to acquire. Although 
Vodafone was accused of paying too much for its acquisitions in the early 2000s, 
in fact the entire sector proved difficult to value, and hindsight has shown it was 
over-valued.
When company value is elusive and hard to quantify, as when trying to 
assess the growth potential of platform acquisitions, the tendency is to revert to 
the heuristics of relative values (rules of thumb) that may over- or underesti-
mate target values and rely too little on fundamental valuation methods. Market 
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inefficiencies can lead to financial markets failing to price firms correctly, and 
the resultant inaccurate market valuations inevitably influence acquisition deci-
sions.19 Irrationality in financial markets affected both the valuation and the 
financing of Vodafone’s acquisitions.
Pitfall 5: 
Relative Valuation with Insufficient Adjustment
Relative (rather than absolute) valuing, often utilizing heuristics, can 
introduce flaws into the process of valuing a target. The common human 
tendency to rely too heavily on one characteristic or piece of already known 
information when making decisions represents a cognitive bias that has been 
described as “anchoring.” Estimates and decisions are based on familiar positions 
or known “anchors,” with insufficient adjustment being made relative to this 
known starting point. In terms of valuing, these heuristics can entail anchoring 
the offer on an earlier price, either taken from transactions involving compa-
rable companies (or perhaps the target itself) but without making appropriate 
adjustments.
During normal decision making, individuals anchor (or overly rely) on 
specific information or a specific value and then adjust that value to account for 
other elements. However, once the anchor is set, there is usually a bias toward 
that value. Take, for example, an executive supported by advisors deciding to set 
an offer price on a target. They may start from the basis of prices paid for simi-
lar companies, and then use “multiples” (e.g., Enterprise Value to EBITDA and 
Price/Earnings multiples) as their basis for refining their valuation of the com-
pany, rather than considering how well the target company and its strategy fit 
into the bidder’s own strategy. The valuation may suffer from related biases, e.g., 
“representativeness,”  where the valuation is overly dependent on relative valu-
ation compared to its peers or to a rival bid.
Again, insufficient adjustment to an early anchor figure can lead an 
acquirer to underbid or to overpay. The boardroom experiment “Anchor and 
Adjustment” (in Table 3) illustrates the dangers of such cognitive drawbacks in 
the valuation analysis of target companies.20
A relative multiple analysis should only function as a reality check on a fundamental valu-
ation, utilizing tools such as NPVs augmented with real options to determine the value of 
current operations and growth options.
Pitfall 6: 
Mispricing in Financial Markets: Beauty is in the Eye of a Beholder
The analysis becomes more complex when (already biased) bidders 
observe rival bidders and attempt to account for their actions and reactions. 
The “Biased Beauty Contest” game (see again Table 3) can be a metaphor for 
thinking about multiple valuations in financial markets.21 Sometimes the price 
seems to be determined by the “perception of beauty” of others, who in their 
turn might be basing their perceptions on their view of how others perceive the 
“beauty” of the target. Pricing in financial markets and bidding in the pri-
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vate equity world sometimes work in the same way, with bidders basing their 
“guesses” as to a target’s value on their perceptions of other bidders’ estimates.22
In a consolidating industry, the dynamics of relative value are markedly 
more acute than for acquisitions in simpler sectors, since targets take on increas-
ingly strategic meaning as the industry consolidates. Beyond its scarcity value, 
the same target may play a particular role in the serial acquisition strategies of, 
or offer unique synergies to, one or more bidders, with the result that different 
parties may have (perhaps markedly) different views as to its value. When bid-
ding managers and financial analysts both use comparable methods, the valu-
ations of assets acquired for specific strategic reasons (which may be unique to 
one acquirer) can lead to misperceptions about their value for the entire sector. 
Pitfall Bias/
Heuristic Board Room Experiment 
Description of Human 
Biases that Affect 
Valuation
Pitfall 5.
Biases in 
Valuation 
Analysis:
Anchoring 
and insufficient 
adjustment, 
representative, 
available and 
affect heuristics
Experiment: “Anchor and Adjustment”
This experiment shows how we anchor our 
estimates. A valuation team is asked two questions: 
“Is the number of countries in Africa more or less than 
[a high or low random number]?” and “How many 
countries do you believe there are in Africa?” 
Participants given a low random number in the 
formulation of the first question tend to significantly 
underestimate the number of countries when 
answering the second question, while those given a 
high random number in tend to overestimate their 
second answer. 
In relative valuation we base 
estimates and decisions on familiar 
positions or “anchors,” and often 
make insufficient subsequent 
adjustments relative to that starting 
point. Even in fundamental valuations, 
we tend to “work to a given value” 
when uncertainty is involved.
A valuation may be biased if it is 
based on readily available information 
relative to less salient information 
(the “availability” heuristic), or when 
valuation and decisions are based on 
intuition (the “affect” heuristic). 
Pitfall 6.
Excess Pricing 
in Financial 
Markets: 
Biased beauty 
contest
Experiment: “Biased Beauty Contest”
Participants are asked to write down a number 
between 0 and 100 such that their guess will be as 
close as possible to 2/3 of the average guess in the 
group.
Behavioral economists use this experiment to 
show the bounds of rationality in game theory. A 
player might think that the average participant is 
not involved and that their average guess will be 
50. So they guess 33, which is 2/3 of 50. The next 
order of sophistication in “thinking how others 
think” incorporates the view that the other guessers 
will understand the same first level of thinking, and 
so assume that they will guess 33 on average, and 
therefore select 22 (as 2/3 of 33).
Game theorists search for an equilibrium—that is, a 
number which, if everyone guessed it, no one would 
have any incentive to change their guess: in this 
instance, that number would be 0. 
Sometimes the price seems to be 
determined by the “perception 
of beauty” of others, who in their 
turn might base their “perception 
of beauty” on what they think our 
perception is. Relative valuation of a 
target can therefore be risky if the 
benchmark is itself mispriced and 
does not rely on fundamental analysis. 
The relative appreciation of an 
acquirer can be used as means of 
financing its follow-on acquisitions 
(e.g., Vodafone’s market appreciation 
helped it to acquire targets in bidding 
contests by paying in shares).
TABLE 3. Biases that Affect Company Valuation
Playing at Serial Acquisitions
CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW  VOL. 53, NO. 1  FALL 2010  CMR.BERKELEY.EDU 69
Market prices can also deviate from fundamental value (as happened in the dot-
com bubble that affected the financial markets during the early 2000s). Given 
the vulnerability of financial market valuations to environmental turbulence, 
therefore, unless a particular target has unique strategic value (for example, as 
part of a premeditated serial acquisition strategy) or offers significant synergies, 
buyers would be well warned to assess critically the validity of comparable or 
relative valuations.
Financial markets were at the peak of their irrational exuberance at the 
turn of the millennium and, with “new economy” firms in hot demand into 
2001, may have greatly overvalued the telecoms industry’s growth opportuni-
ties. Serial acquirers sometimes chose to finance their acquisitions with shares, 
both to take advantage of relative appreciation within the sector, and at the 
same time to hedge against whole sector mispricing by financial markets. Voda-
fone countered the anxieties expressed about the costs of its serial acquisition 
strategy in this period by paying with its own shares, so as to benefit from the 
general re-rating of the telecoms industry at the time—in effect, they served as a 
useful “currency” helping to mitigate the potential for overpayment for its “fully 
priced” targets.
Can Rational Analysis Discipline Strategy?
Executives need to be constantly aware of their potential biases if they 
are to protect themselves from making suboptimal decisions in their strategies, 
in their company valuations, and in their bidding decisions. However, aware-
ness alone may not be sufficient to ensure a successful consolidation strategy: 
psychologists have demonstrated that recognizing our errors and biases does not 
necessarily lead us to be able to correct them and go on to more rational decision 
making.
A quantification using a “rational” real options23 and games analysis 
approach may offer further help in mitigating the effects of several cognitive 
biases. The advantage of integrating game theory into the options approach is 
that it explicitly recognizes value erosion and the interaction of rival bidders 
playing the game of “musical chairs” for available acquisitions under conditions 
of uncertainty.
In this view, bidding on a platform acquisition should be based on an 
expanded NPV criterion:
Expanded NPV = 
(standalone value of platform-price)
+ added value of future (shared) synergistic opportunities
This starts with the platform’s standalone value and expected synergies 
but also uses real options to take into account the potential for follow-on acqui-
sitions, as well as using game theory to predict the strategic impact of rival bids. 
When a target is offered at an auction, or when multiple bidders make an offer 
for a publicly traded firm, value can be eroded if other buyers seem likely to 
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bid up the price. To avoid overpayment, executives should use financial market 
valuations as a top-down objective view of growth option value that confirms or 
disconfirms the added value of consolidation, rather than depending solely on 
subjective management information.
Illustration:
Vodafone’s Acquisition Strategy as a Portfolio of Real Options
The successful way to structure a list of target options into a consolida-
tion strategy is to map alternative acquisition paths—that is, to adopt a “lattice” 
approach, mapping long-term contingent series of acquisitions and organic 
investments against the key uncertainties that, as they are resolved, could 
change the available options. With the help of some hindsight, Figure 1 presents 
a simplified illustration of the staged decision structure of Vodafone’s strategy 
and of the synergistic opportunities arising from its acquisitions or alliances.24
The sequential acquisition strategy stages are represented as branches of a tree. 
Exercising its UK acquisition options gave Vodafone a dominating home market 
position that provided it with a platform that enabled it to pursue a worldwide 
network expansion strategy and leverage the competences it gained into follow-
on acquisitions, as well as enhancing its cash flows via various cost and market-
ing efficiencies.
The various types of acquisition options are the building blocks of a serial 
acquisition strategy. A real options analysis requires the team to identify explic-
itly the various types of options (e.g., platform investment or asset divestment 
options) and to use option valuation methods (e.g., the binomial model) to 
value the set of real options embedded in the organization and its businesses.
(Several of these acquisition options types are described in Figure 1.)
First, the option characteristics of different types of potential acquisition 
targets must be considered. Acquisitions that realize their benefits primarily 
through synergies or through expected earnings streams (or operating cash-
flows) are classified here as asset acquisition options. For instance, Vodafone 
pursued a strategy of acquiring follow-on options in existing operations—
sequentially increasing its shareholdings in Vodafone Libertel (Netherlands), 
Vodafone-Panafon Hellenic (Greece), Vodafone Telecel-Comunicacoes Pessoais 
SA (Portugal), and Europolitan Vodafone AB (Sweden)—the fundamental ratio-
nale for which was simply to deliver growth. A minority stake25 that creates 
an advantaged opportunity for the holder to increase its stake in a target can 
be viewed as “call option” on the company value (its underlying asset), with 
the “bid” as the exercise price and time to maturity equal to the horizon of the 
acquisition opportunity.
A platform acquisition option,26 however, involves a higher growth option 
value than an asset acquisition option, since it involves an option on the underlying 
call options. A platform acquisition—be it to access an emerging market or a joint 
venture where firms combine resources—can be a critical component in a serial 
acquisition strategy. Such an acquisition derives a significant part of its value by 
creating a new path for follow-on investment opportunities, thus altering both 
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the position of the enterprise and its strategic course. (Likewise Vodafone gained 
a strong platform in the U.S. when it outbid Bell Atlantic for AirTouch.)
The defining characteristic of a platform acquisition is that it provides 
a powerful step into a new environment and access to a new array of future 
investment opportunities, perhaps including access to a new geography. If syner-
gies and future options prove sufficiently valuable, follow-on acquisitions can be 
made that will further enhance the consolidator’s position in its new market.
Vodafone executed a series of opportunistic platform acquisitions to posi-
tion itself for multiple follow-on acquisitions using the buy-and-build principle. 
Serial acquisitions represent conditional platform trajectories that establish 
specific targets and have “intersections” at several junctures in time, as well as 
define a limited number of possible outcomes for an industry endgame. Voda-
fone’s platform acquisitions in the U.S., Europe, China, and Japan each provided 
a basis for growth in that region.
For this kind of real option application, a discrete-time binomial analysis 
might be the most appropriate approach. The initial decision to invest in a plat-
form can be made by first creating a number of industry endgame scenarios and
then solving them backwards to evaluate all future potential outcomes of a pro-
posed consolidation strategy. The idea is to begin with the growth potential of 
each platform at the terminal nodes in the decision tree, and then reason back-
wards to determine the optimal decision to make at each key point. Often, exit 
or mature continuing values are modeled as the end node of the binomial tree of 
a portfolio of options, using binomial option pricing or simulation.27 Reasoning 
backwards from each scenario and examining each potential juncture at which 
a platform acquisition and follow-on investments can be made also permits the 
development of a multitude of path segments for each of the company’s major 
competitors, so generating valuable insight to what their possible moves might 
be, and thus into the relative value of each target to each competitor.28
Overcoming Pitfall 1: Real Options Can Mitigate Effects 
from Narrow Framing or Aversion to Certain Losses
Aversion to a certain loss may result in overinvestment even when all 
signs warn otherwise, while narrow framing can mean potential buyers are not 
taking full advantage of acquisition opportunities’ upward potential, thus miss-
ing the boat in a consolidating industry. The real options approach supports a 
more adaptive and opportunistic strategy, as the currently envisioned acquisition 
trajectory is not regarded as static. Rather, the approach allows for the oppor-
tunistic revision of targets and periodic adjustments in the number and pattern 
of investments, depending on market growth or unexpected external develop-
ments. When the success of a serial acquisition strategy is redefined in terms of 
options and uncertainty, it provides a rationale for implementing, altering, or 
deferring decisions, depending on the evolution of the external environment.
First, a real options approach can mitigate the biases that lead to a conser-
vative strategy being based on too-narrow framing. A platform acquisition is no 
longer considered in isolation, but rather as a first link in a chain of investments, 
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where earlier investments are prerequisites for those that follow. Interestingly, 
according to real option theory, business risk or dispersion of future company 
FIGURE 1. Staged Decisions in Vodafone’s Buy-and-Build Acquisition Strategy
platform US
AirTouch
start domestic
expansion
FAILURE
platform
SUCCESS
defer or abandon
domestic expansion
FAILURE
start
geographical
expansion
SUCCESS
defer or abandon
geographical
expansion
platform Europe
Mannesmann
platform China
platform Japan
J-phone
Category Description
Stage I
Multiple or Parallel Platform Options
(Series of Compound Growth Option)
Platform businesses with domestic (UK) reputations and competencies 
provided the basis to leverage core competencies and marketing 
capabilities into a broader geographical base. 
Stage II
Timing of Asset Acquisitions 
(Simple Timing Option)
Consolidation, building up scale in a fragmented market. Vodafone 
continued to consolidate—or increase stakes in existing investments—
as long as the net synergies of the acquisition and growth options at 
that time were sufficiently valuable. 
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values can exert a substantial positive influence on the value of real growth 
options and may justify (staged) acquisition decisions in uncertain areas.29
FAILURE
growth potential US
SUCCESS
FAILURE
growth potential Europe
SUCCESS
FAILURE
growth potential China
SUCCESS
FAILURE
growth potential Japan
SUCCESS
follow-up acquisitions (simple options)
defer or abandon
follow-up acquisition
defer or abandon
follow-up acquisition
defer or abandon
follow-up acquisition
follow-up acquisitions (simple options)
Option Definition Example
A platform acquisition is a compound option—an 
option on options. The platform can be viewed as a 
call option on follow-on investment opportunities (i.e. 
as an underlying call option), with the exercise price 
as the follow-on target price and the time to maturity 
being equal to the horizon. Valuing a series of parallel 
compound options is more complex, since it may involve 
a collection of interacting sequential options, which 
has an additional operating value derived from the 
opportunity to benefit from uncertainty through the 
coordination of subsidiaries that may be geographically 
dispersed (e.g., see Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994).
Having built a domestic platform in the UK, the 
acquisition of similar sized rivals—such as AirTouch 
in the US, (1999), Mannesmann in Europe (2000 and 
Japan Telecom (2001)—quickly increased Vodafone’s 
scale and diversity. These platform acquisitions shaped 
Vodafone’s future acquisition opportunities and merger 
alternatives by creating a world-class brand, offering 
access to North America, Europe, China and Japan and 
significant scale as one of the world’s largest telecoms 
companies.
Each opportunity for an acquirer to bid for or increase 
its stake in a target can be viewed as a call option on 
the company value for the bidder (i.e. an underlying 
asset), with the initial bid as the exercise price and time 
to maturity being equal to the horizon of the acquisition 
opportunity. This resembles a call option on the value of 
synergistic benefits where the exercise price is the cost 
of the merger.
Examples include smaller sized follow–on acquisitions 
in various geographies which saw Vodafone increasing 
its equity stakes in Vodafone Libertel (Netherlands), 
Vodafone-Panafon Hellenic (Greece), Vodafone Telecel-
Comunicacoes Pessoais SA (Portuga), Europolitan 
Vodafone AB (Sweden), Airtel (Spain), Grupo Iusacell 
(Mexico) and others.
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Second, appropriate use of a real options approach should help pre-
vent overinvestment due to aversion to certain losses. Real options focuses on 
flexibility: as information about the success of a staged acquisition strategy is 
revealed, management can decide whether to proceed to the next stage or to 
alter or even terminate its future investment plans. A real options approach dic-
tates that it is preferable to increase option value by staging acquisition processes 
in uncertain regions (such as emerging markets), first acquiring a minority stake 
or establishing a joint venture to gain entry into a new market, rather than roll-
ing out investments quickly into commitment-intensive acquisitions.
Clear external thresholds or trigger levels—such as projected demand lev-
els or critical product prices—on which decisions should be based, or which indi-
cate alternative actions (such as deferral or the pursuit of an alternative target), 
can force executives to adjust their decisions and so help avoid overcommitment 
due to an aversion to taking a loss. An ex ante option analysis will therefore 
differ from a biased analysis and should make it easier for executives to let go 
of intended targets without implying personal defeat. Thus, the options view 
should allow them to take full advantage of the upside potential created when 
events turn out better than expected, but still limit their losses on the downside.
Mitigating Pitfall 2: Which Judgment Biases Can 
a Real Options Frame Mitigate, and Which Can It Not?
Judgment biases among the top team will change the way a strategy is 
conceived and presented and will tend to implicitly support the assumption 
that things will turn out exactly as predicted in the strategic plan. An illusion of 
control may lead to a static strategy that continues to aim at acquiring intended 
targets, irrespective of whether they are no longer attractive or relevant in a 
changing business environment. The real options view does not consider the 
successful execution of a serial acquisition strategy as being a process that is 
entirely under the “control” of the executives, but rather as one that is partly 
conditional on the external uncertainty and subject to extraneous events.
A real options approach analyses the business environment by assign-
ing probability distributions and values to uncertain macroeconomic, industry 
or business developments. Explicitly requiring management to model external 
uncertainty limits the self-serving bias where an executive team unconsciously 
credits its own actions when acquisitions succeed and invokes bad luck when 
they fail. To help overcome insufficient adjustment to (historic) starting points 
or anchors, forward-looking tools such as real options avoid treating their tar-
gets' intentions as a static scenario but instead adjust acquisition paths dynami-
cally depending on uncertain developments.
Confirmation enforced by groupthink may also bias the acquisition plan 
in a static way, and real options can help mitigate this problem to some extent. 
A platform acquisition or entry into a new geographic market has embedded 
option value precisely because it has the potential to create or exploit future
investment opportunities, not predetermined commitments.
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A warning should be made as this point. Valuation models—especially 
real options—can be used for self-justification or rationalization. By framing 
acquisition opportunities as real options, one can start to see options everywhere 
and should take care to avoid taking an over-optimistic view of acquisitions’ 
growth options to justify a higher bid. To suppress overvaluation of growth 
option values, targets should be selected from a comprehensive list, and care 
should be taken not to overestimate the levels of added value—either in terms 
of synergies or future options—associated with each opportunity.30 Judgment 
biases can also serve to increase the value of growth options so as to justify or 
rationalize intended investment decisions. This is a weakness of any valuation 
method including a real options analysis. One way of limiting overvaluation is to 
integrate real options analysis with game theory; another way is to check valua-
tions against (presumably more) objective values in financial markets.
How to Use Option-Games to Overcome Bidding Pitfalls
Vodafone’s hostile $205 billion acquisition of Mannesmann in Germany 
was an example of escalated bidding. The European market was undergoing 
rapid consolidation and the limited acquisition opportunities in the industry 
were hotly contested. Vodafone had to secure its place as a key European opera-
tor against its main rivals such as Germany’s T-Mobile. The enhanced value of 
Mannesmann to Vodafone stemmed partly from it representing a potential plat-
form in Germany towards securing the dominating position in the consolidating 
European telecoms sector that Vodafone aimed at.
Suppose that the standalone value of Mannesmann could be estimated at 
$71 billion, the synergies at $2 billion, and the divestment options at $50 bil-
lion.31 The expanded NPV with the additional strategic value component could 
therefore be calculated as follows:
Expanded NPV =
(net stand-alone value of platform + abandonment options) – price) 
+ [expected synergies + strategic growth option value from Mannesmann in European expansion]
= [71 + 50 – 205] + [2 + strategic growth option value]
= [strategic growth option value] – 82
So, even though Vodafone’s acquisition gained it embedded platforms in 
two of Europe’s most important mobile telecoms markets (Germany and Italy), 
justifying its final bid for Mannesmann involved effectively estimating the value 
of the strategic growth options involved at $82 billion—a figure so high one 
could consider it unlikely. One could surmise, then, that Vodafone’s preemptive 
bid was motivated (at least in part) by its desire to win, rather than fairly reflect-
ing the fundamental growth option value of its acquisition.
Naturally, the growth option value for a consolidator created through 
potential future acquisition is the excess value of the target to the successful 
acquirer over the acquisition price, i.e., the firm’s ability to extract a synergis-
tic value from the acquisition beyond what it pays for it. In the option game 
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approach, the potential of making acquisitions is valued on both their value and
price characteristics. In this context the value of the acquisition is what the target 
is potentially worth to each bidder, based on the impact on that bidder’s accumu-
lation path. Price, on the other hand, is what the successful bidder ultimately 
pays. How a (simplified) option game of acquisition growth potential works is 
illustrated in the Sidebar.32
Value is what the winner gets, price is what the winner pays.
Overcoming Bidding Pitfall 3: Avoid Irrational Escalation in Bidding, 
but Play Poker by Betting Against Rival’s Predictable Biases
Like the valuation of a call option, the value of the acquisition option 
game is determined by a backward induction process. Looking forward and rea-
soning back may help avoid biases due to the “sunk cost” fallacy or to over com-
mitment, but encourages executives to let go when events turn out worse than 
expected.
In the build-up to an auction, a biased rival bidder will have a differ-
ent market response to that of a rational bidder. Rivals who are biased and/or 
overconfident may fail to see all the consequences of their actions, so that while 
rational players perceive the decisions in a game clearly and consistently, their 
rivals may still base their decisions on heuristics or have psychological biases and 
so outbid them in auctions.
Acquisition games are therefore better applied if rationality is combined 
with insights from behavioral economics, so bidders can predict and thus ratio-
nally respond to their rivals’ irrational behaviors.33 The rational bidder should 
take an opportunistic view and try to avoid battles that lead to escalating com-
mitment to bidding. As noted, overcommitment arises in situations in which the 
bidding process is costly, but there still seems to be the possibility of achieving 
better outcomes by bidding further. This is particularly so when acquisition value 
is hard to ascertain, where there is interest from multiple bidders, or where bid-
ders have experienced a recent period of successes in acquisition battles. While 
an overconfident and over-optimistic rival is hard to beat in a bidding contest 
without paying an excess premium, executives must remember that exiting the 
bidding game can also be a valuable option.
Rational bidders can “play poker” against biased rivals to take advantage 
of their psychological strategy biases. For instance, in the early stages of industry 
consolidation, rivals may have a conservative strategy and frame acquisitions 
too narrowly, holding them back from making risky consolidating acquisitions. 
Recognizing this bias allows a canny consolidator to identify where and when 
to make an early bid to avoid ending up in a bidding contest later in the game. 
Vodafone’s aggressive build-up strategy allowed it to seize the initiative in a frag-
mented and growing telecoms market by moving before its rivals into an aggres-
sive acquisition growth program that would enable the enlarged firm to gain 
increasing market share and become an industry leader in a growing sector.
Generally, acquisition options are not proprietary but are “shared” with 
rival bidders, creating a disincentive or additional costs to counterbidders. These 
Playing at Serial Acquisitions
CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW  VOL. 53, NO. 1  FALL 2010  CMR.BERKELEY.EDU 77
SIDEBAR:  How the Option Game Valuation 
of Acquisition Opportunities Works
Consider the case of two comparable bidders (A and B) each having the opportunity to 
acquire a target. An option games valuation works backwards based on the following steps:
• calculate the payoff values of the target for bidder A and bidder B in a 2x2 matrix (sub-
game);
• determine dominant bidding strategies and the Nash equilibrium in each 2x2 sub-game; 
and
• use option valuation to work backward in the binomial tree using the equilibrium values 
from the two sub-games in the up and down business cycle states.
The current value of the company for bidder A equals $4bn and for bidder B $3.2bn. Uncer-
tainty in the cycle and company value is modeled by a lattice approach where the value can 
either move up (u = 1.25) or down (d = 0.80) depending on industry product demand. 
Payoffs in the 2x2 Matrix (bidding sub-game)
Making a bid corresponds to taking or increasing a stake in a target. Exercising the option early 
may pre-empt the rival’s acquisition opportunity, but deferring a bid is consistent with a cau-
tious strategy that is less expensive, more flexible and safer in case of unfavorable economic 
developments. The figure below shows the payoffs in this economic uncertainty dilemma. Con-
sider first the up-cycle scenario. The left 2x2 table summarizes the payoffs (bidder A, bidder B)
in four investment-timing scenarios in an upward moving market situation:
(i) when both firms enter into a contest and bid (simultaneously) the total expected synergies 
are reflected in the price. Suppose that in the up-cycle the target value for bidder A is $5bn 
(V+=uV) and for bidder B $4bn. The bidding costs are equal at $0.5bn. The NPV for bidder A 
equals the target private value for the bidder minus price minus bidding cost (5 – 4 – 0.5 = 
0.5). Since bidder A assigns a higher value to the target (due to its complementary assets), bid-
der B will be outbid and he will incur the bidding cost (minus $0.5bn), resulting in a (0.5, –0.5) 
payoff for each bidder, with bidder A capturing the target against B’s value;
(ii)/(iii) when one investor bids while the other makes no offer, the bidder secures the target 
for $3.5bn and captures a larger part of the value creation for themselves (5 – 3.5 – 0.5 = 1 
for bidder A), resulting in a payoff of (1, 0) or (0,0) respectively if B bids and bidder A does not 
enter (4 – 3.5 – 0.5 = 0 for bidder B);
and (iv) when both firms decide to wait, they share the total additional value created by the 
timing flexibility equally, cushioning their downward losses. Suppose that this payoff equals 
(0.75, 0.25).
Dominant Strategies and Nash Equilibrium
The next step is to identify dominant strategies in the above sub-game and determine the 
resulting Nash equilibrium. Dominant strategies are those actions that always give a player a 
higher payoff value than any alternative action, whatever the other player decides to do.
continued on next page
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Consider the equilibrium implications of an asymmetric payoff structure as in the bidding game 
described earlier and shown below. Suppose that bidder A’s payoff for pursuing the acquisition 
(lower row) exceeds the payoff of letting it go (upper row), no matter which strategy Bidder
B chooses ($1bn > $0.75bn and $0.5bn > $0bn). Then bidder A has a dominant strategy to 
pursue the acquisition. Given this, firm B will not pursue the acquisition (since $0bn > –0.5bn). 
The Nash equilibrium outcome of this game (marked *) is given by the down left cell (1, 0), 
where bidder A acquires the company against firm B‘s value.
We can perform a similar analysis for a down cycle. Here we assume the payoff in the right-
hand 2x2 matrix below, where neither firm can generate net synergies from the consolidation, 
and neither will make an offer, resulting in a (0,0) payoff.
Backward Option Valuation of Growth Opportunities (PVGO) along the Binomial Tree 
Note: Payoff in each cell is for (Bidder A, Bidder B);
strategies of firm A are wait (upper row) or bid (lower row); 
strategies of firm B are wait (left column) or bid (right column).
The risk neutral probability (following from the binomial option model) equals:
0.56 .p == =
(1+r)– d
u – d
(1+0.05)– 0.80
1.25– 0.80
For the up and down cycle situations, the sub-games have (different) Nash equilibriums in pure 
strategies. As we have seen above (see also left 2x2 matrix), in the up cycle the advantaged 
bidder captures the opportunity (with Nash equilibrium values being ($1bn) in box (ii). But in 
the down cycle, the Nash equilibrium is for both bidders to wait instead (thus receiving $0 in 
box (iv) in the right hand 2x2 matrix above). The present value of the growth opportunity for 
bidder A to acquire the target (PVGO) is the discounted weighted average of the Nash equi-
librium outcomes across the up and down cycle states. 
Bidder B
Wait
W
ai
t
iv iii
(0.75, 0.25) (0, 0)
ii iB
id
de
r 
A
(1, 0)* (0.5, –0.5)
Bid
Bi
d
Bidder B
Wait
W
ai
t
iv iii
(0, 0)* (0, –0.8)
ii iB
id
de
r 
A
(–1, 0) (–0.8, –1)
Bid
Bi
d
up cycle, p = 0.56 down cycle, p = 0.44
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factors can help the acquirer secure its target and can also provide additional 
optionality to time the acquisition of a part-acquired target or of follow-on tar-
gets more effectively. (For example, a pre-investment in the form of a minor-
ity or blocking stake may increase the bidder’s ability to gain control.) A bidder 
who can consolidate early in an industry on the threshold of a consolidation 
wave can enjoy significant advantages in acquiring companies and building 
competitive position compared to late movers. The revelation of the success of 
Vodafone’s acquisition strategy triggered a series of mergers and acquisitions 
in the industry, changing the probability of success of specific strategies. In the 
endgame, rival consolidators may end up in a negative sum game, with intense 
competition for assets, overcommitment, and bidding wars reducing the eco-
nomic pie by attracting capital into the industry at excessive levels relative to the 
potential returns.
Acquisition games are better modeled if rationality is combined with an understanding 
of the likely behavioral patterns and biases of rival bidders.
Overcome Bidding Pitfall 4: 
How to Avoid the Winner’s Curse and Create a Unique Position
To avoid the winner’s curse, a rational bidder should try to gather infor-
mation and develop an independent view about the fundamental value of what 
is being sold, both to the company itself and to its rivals. The winner’s curse 
underscores the importance of relying on fundamental methods for valuing 
targets in competitive settings. In particular, when a target’s value is elusive 
and there are multiple bidders, some may overvalue and others undervalue the 
assets being sold. Thus it is crucial that a firm makes every effort to improve its 
information about a target, certainly to gain superior information to that avail-
able to its rivals in a bidding contest.
Savvy bidders will avoid the winner’s curse by "shading" their bid, setting 
it below their (ex ante) estimation of the uncertain value of the target. The less 
accurate their valuation (e.g., the higher growth option value it includes), the 
lower the bid should be. The severity of the winner’s curse increases with the 
number of bidders, and also when the average bid is higher relative to exterior 
market conditions because of judgment biases.
Backward induction using the sub-games represented by the above two 2x2 matrices (under 
up vs. down cycle) results in a (sub-game perfect) equilibrium trajectory. The process moves 
backward over random demand moves using the associated risk-adjusted probabilities to cal-
culate values at the beginning of the binomial tree. In determining the growth option value the 
average is computed as the risk-adjusted expectation of the two equilibrium outcomes (1 for 
high cycle, 0 for low cycle) using the risk-adjusted probabilities (p = 0.56 for an up-cycle trend 
and 0.44 for a down-cycle trend, with discounting performed at the “riskless” interest rate of 
r = 0.05). 
    0.53bn .1.05
0.44(0)0.56(1)
PVGO*A =
+
=
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The winner’s curse does not apply to all auctions. In the early stages of a 
consolidation there may be occasions when the average bid is too low relative 
to the target’s fundamental value, e.g., when biased rivals are too conservative 
and have not yet recognized the target’s potential strategic value to an acquirer. 
Similarly, bidders from different contexts—e.g., private equity bidder vs. a stra-
tegic player or consolidator vs. a non-consolidating bidder—are likely to assign 
different values to the same target. When the company has private value (e.g., 
when it generates unique synergies with one of the rival bidders), the winner’s 
curse also does not arise.
The issue in developing paths is to what extent the acquirer can develop 
a unique and advantaged position (to appropriate further growth options) 
compared to other firms involved in similar buy-and-build strategies. The fac-
tors affecting each firm’s growth options may also differ, generating significant 
differences in how they exercise and time their bids. It is precisely in these cir-
cumstances that the consolidating bidder’s ability to assess the strategic value of 
a target as accurately as possible—within the context of its defined serial acqui-
sition strategy—becomes essential to ensuring it continues to deliver sustained 
growth in shareholder value.
Company- and context-specific platform path dependencies will mean the 
value of a specific follow-on target to one potential acquirer is unlikely to equal 
its value to another, and this will cause a variance between its inherent value 
and the ultimate price different bidders are willing to pay. Organizational capa-
bilities and their set of corporate real options—and the impact of uncertainty 
itself—will differ for each firm. Exercising the option to expand, for instance, 
is going to be more valuable for a consolidator than for a non-consolidating 
player, especially if the consolidator is a market leader by virtue of its size, earlier 
acquisitions, and complementary assets. Naturally, a realistic review of potential 
interlopers into the bidding process must be performed, as well as an evaluation 
of the unique incremental value of the target to each rival bidder, taking their 
different synergies and strategic objectives into account.
The optimal route for consolidators in these circumstances may well be 
to seize the advantage by taking preemptive action at relatively low prices, and 
target selection should be based on securing increasing advantage. If the con-
solidating company has already established a dominant position in its industry, 
the threat of preemption by a smaller rival is reduced, unless the rival is able to 
capture a blocking position—for example, by securing a small but decisive stake 
in a desirable target. 
Dual Valuation of Growth Option Value 
to Avoid Irrational Infection
As with all analyses, the high degree of subjectivity inherent in design-
ing acquisition paths and the variables used in real options analysis mean that 
the associated techniques can also be used inappropriately to justify a preferred 
course of action or higher bidding prices.34 The fundamental valuation of a con-
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solidation strategy should be subjected to a “reality test” by comparing it with 
the value of assets and growth options of industry players of different sizes and 
using various strategies. Shareholder value must be the key criterion in assess-
ing an acquisition, so the value added by the consolidation strategy should ulti-
mately equal the amount by which the future value of the consolidating firm 
exceeds the sum of the costs of its individual acquisitions and of any organic 
growth it pursues. This top-down analysis can function as a reality check on a 
fundamental valuation by using option game tools to determine the value of its 
current operations, their embedded options, and those that might arise from an 
intended acquisition.
When fragmented markets are ripe for consolidation, the appreciation of 
a company’s value in financial markets may exhibit the following characteristics:
6h Relative overpricing of bidders’ equity compared to equity of targets in financial 
markets—Evidence suggests that takeover activity is strongly related to 
stock market valuation.35 The relative value of leading companies allows 
them to acquire serial targets relatively cheaply, taking advantage of their 
highly valued equity to finance their transactions.36 A serial acquisition 
strategy can be based on rational value drivers, but also on mispric-
ing—the case of Vodafone seems to be consistent with these findings. Its 
acquisitions were concentrated in the period 1998-2000 when its share 
price was at its peak. Empirical studies also show that targets are in gen-
eral undervalued relative to bidders, or at least less overpriced by financial 
markets.37 A bidder may try to select a target that offers better value for 
their higher value equity.
6h The value of assets in place and implied growth options is relatively higher for 
leading corporations—When financial markets work efficiently, the com-
pany’s full value, its growth opportunities, its strategic position in the 
industry and the economic logic of its consolidation activities should all 
be reflected in its stock price. The gap between the company’s market 
value and the present value of the earnings capacity of its assets in place 
represents the value placed on the firm’s strategy to appropriate profitable 
corporate growth opportunities—or its “implied PVGO,”38 i.e.:
Implied PVGO = Market Value (MV) – Assets in Place (PV)
Consider, for example, an estimation of the proportion of Mannesmann’s 
1996 stock price made up of the present value of its future growth options 
(PVGO/P). The (then) present value of its assets in place can be relatively eas-
ily estimated. Suppose that its 1996 earnings were DM22 per share and the cost 
of equity was 11%, and assume that the earnings capacity of its current assets 
would have been constant under a hypothetical no-growth strategy. The per-
petuity equation results in share values of DM200 for the capitalized value of 
its earnings from assets in place (under a no-growth policy). However, since 
Mannesmann’s average 1996 equity price was DM550, the market’s assessment 
of the PVGO embedded in its stock price amounted to DM350—some 64% of its 
stock market value.
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The value imputed from a growth option analysis is most helpful when 
considering the relative value of possible targets—or when considering the 
value of a specific target to different potential bidders. For consolidation to make 
sense, an efficient financial market should assign a higher value to leading com-
panies’ assets in place (PV) and growth opportunities than to those of smaller 
firms. The larger firms’ lower cost of capital results in an appreciation of their 
assets in place. In addition, their better growth prospects should be reflected in 
higher PVGO-to-Price (and EV/EBITDA) ratios than those of smaller players. 
Vodafone’s average PVGO-to-Price was only slightly higher than those of its larg-
est acquisitions—such as AirTouch (PVGO-to-Price of 85%)39 or Mannesmann 
(PVGO-to-Price of 90%), but considerably higher than its smaller targets (e.g., 
Libertel had a PVGO-to-Price of 69%).
Avoiding Pitfall 5: Bottom-Up Option Valuation 
to Prevent Overreliance on Relative Values and Heuristics
Since the value of a strategic acquisition derives from its ability to 
enhance a consolidator’s strategic position, the valuation of platform acquisitions 
requires careful scrutiny and more sophisticated competitive analysis than either 
suggested by heuristics or offered by a simple relative valuation. A combined real 
options and game theory framework can incorporate the elusive strategic value 
that is so hard to capture when using starting points or anchors. This analysis is 
beneficial in quantifying the merits of strategic alternatives and helping assess 
tradeoffs, so that “price tags” can be attached to investment decisions.
However, companies should be careful about inferring that rational analy-
sis is “truth”—the misperception that once numbers are attached, data are “accu-
rate.” Although we argue that analysis can be sensitive to biases, we do not argue 
that strategic intuition is necessarily flawed. However, real options and game 
techniques can complement the intuitive strategic thinking process in a dynamic 
way that will be consistent with that strategy’s underlying logic and design. It is 
essential to translate the qualitative discussion of projects into a proper options 
structure and identify its strategic elements. Game theory supplemented with 
options analysis helps to tackle the complex strategic problem involved in this 
process and reduce it to a simpler analytical structure. The framework it provides 
can also promote clear management recommendations for executable actions by 
guiding managers’ decisions as to whether, when, and under what conditions 
investments would be appropriate.
Overcome Pitfall 6: 
Can Financial Markets Provide an External View?
The PVGO measure is arguably contingent on market sentiment, and 
market inefficiencies mean market value (MV) may not reflect fundamental firm 
value. Empirical studies typically separate market value into intrinsic and mis-
priced elements. We can separate out these behavioral finance arguments in a 
new decomposition of firm value.
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This method “backs out” the value of the growth option set from the 
firm’s equity value, but with the modification that the market value is adjusted 
for mispricing. The present value of growth options (PVGO) can be estimated 
from the value of assets in place and the adjusted market value of the firm. This 
is done by first using a pricing model to estimate the mispricing in the market 
value and deducting from the market capitalization (MV) both any excess (mis-
priced) value (XSP)40 as well as the present value (PV) component on the same 
basis as before (i.e., continuing current operations based on past investments or 
assets in place in a no-growth scenario and estimated using standard NPV tech-
niques). The remaining (residual) equity value is taken to reflect the value of the 
firm’s set of growth options (PVGO).41 That is:
Implied PVGO =
Market Value (MV) – Excess Pricing (XSP)
– Net Value of Assets in Place (PV)
Firms in growth industries (e.g., computers, software, and drugs) tend 
on average to have a higher growth option value component (PVGO/MV) than 
firms in income industries for two reasons: first, they operate in more volatile 
and rapidly evolving industries (characterized by more frequent technological 
innovations and more intense competition), and this higher underlying volatil-
ity is translated into higher (simple) option values. Second, they tend to have a 
higher proportion of compound (multi-stage or growth) than simple (cash-gen-
erating) options, which (since these are options on options) further amplifies 
their strategic value. This higher growth option value, in turn, is translated into 
higher market valuations for these high-tech or growth stocks.
To help overcome the overconfidence bias in acquisition decision making, tools are required 
enabling the economic logic of strategy and financial valuation to interactively complement 
each other.
Conclusions
Many industries are witnessing accelerating consolidation trends—driven 
both by fundamental economic forces and behavioral biases—that will continue 
to dictate the value of consolidating companies and their targets. In order to be 
more successful than their competitors, organizations must seek ways to maxi-
mize their ability to identify and capture new opportunities, while also being 
able to respond appropriately to economic changes, by deferring or abandoning 
intended acquisitions or by contracting production capacity to limit losses from 
adverse market developments. The execution of a serial acquisition strategy is 
vulnerable to the way managers perceive risk and losses, judgment biases in 
their strategy, the bidding behavior of rivals, and mispricing in financial markets.
The various behavioral biases at play can make competitive interactions 
in the acquisition game increasingly complicated and sophisticated. The exist-
ing toolkit for company valuation and acquisition strategy—present value and 
traditional strategy approaches—falls short in resolving biases. We argue that 
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using more sophisticated analysis, applying real options with extensions based 
on games theory and modified market valuations, can result in a strategy that is 
at once more rational and more dynamic.
When properly applied, the bottom-up real options-game approach is an 
attempt to support executive intuition concerning acquisitions with the disci-
pline of a more rigorous analytical and rational process. The decision analysis 
should be complemented with a “top-down” PVGO quantification that uses 
direct information from financial markets to counter irrationality on the inap-
propriate use of the new tools to justify overpayment.
Vodafone’s acquisition history provides an example of the behavioral 
dilemma involved in consolidation acquisitions. Although Vodafone’s huge 
expansion was perceived to be built on the personal ambition of the CEO, with-
out his efforts, Vodafone could not have expanded (via the platform acquisition 
of Mannesmann) to become the world leader it is today. Analyzing this dilemma 
with the approach advocated in this article requires:
6h considering the acquisitions strategy through a real options lens;
6h analyzing the price in the competitive bidding with a game theory exten-
sion; and
6h a reality check using the top-down (PVGO) valuation.
First, we look at the growth strategy through a real options lens. 
Although Vodafone’s CEO was sometimes accused of managerial hubris (Pitfall 
2), he framed Vodafone’s strategy in a manner consistent with a real option view 
(and much more broadly than some of his conservative (Pitfall 1) competitors). 
From this perspective, Vodafone’s Mannesmann acquisition delivered embedded 
platforms in two of Europe’s most important mobile telecoms markets (Germany 
and Italy) as part of a global strategy targeting platform acquisitions across mul-
tiple geographies.
Second, the option game approach is not only about option values, but also 
about price and the bidding game. Even though Vodafone’s Mannesmann acqui-
sition provided a powerful step into new markets, to justify its final bid for Man-
nesmann effectively estimated the value of the strategic growth options involved 
at some $82 billion—a figure so high one would consider it unrealistic from an 
option game perspective. One could surmise that Vodafone’s bid might have been 
motivated in part by its desire to win (Pitfall 3) rather than fairly reflecting the 
target’s fundamental real option value. The general market context made tele-
coms assets difficult to value, making auction bidders vulnerable to the winner’s 
curse (Pitfall 4) and often overly dependent on relative valuation of the target’s 
peers or of rival bids (Pitfall 5).
Third, top-down (PVGO) valuation requires that company valuation and 
financing take into account consideration of the (biased) appreciation of growth 
options in financial markets. Financial markets were at the peak of their irratio-
nal exuberance at the turn of the millennium and may have greatly overvalued 
the entire telecoms industry’s growth opportunities (Pitfall 6). Following the 
insights from the top-down or market method, the excess pricing of Vodafone’s 
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own shares—as result of the general over-rating of the telecoms industry at the 
time—in effect gave it the potential to overpay for its fully priced targets. “New 
economy” firms were in hot demand into 2001 and it would be going too far to 
hold Vodafone responsible for the general overvaluation of the telecoms indus-
try. However, the cost of its serial acquisition strategy and of building the com-
pany to be the world leader it is today was borne by those investors who bought 
Vodafone shares at the top of the cycle in 2001.42
This example takes the specific case of Vodafone’s Mannesmann acquisi-
tion to show the analysis our toolkit can provide compared to that of normal 
company valuation approaches. Note that (in general) the price paid under nor-
mal (PV) methods is typically less than our methods justify, since our tools allow 
for the greater appreciation of future potential (e.g., the platform acquisition 
of MIM by miner Xstrata, the platform acquisition of Pearle by a private equity 
investor HAL who built a global optical chain, or acquisitions by Vodafone before 
the change of the millennium).
This academic framework can assist executives of acquiring companies by 
helping them to discipline their strategy and thus improve their ability to par-
ticipate successfully in consolidation trends in their industries by increasing their 
capability to value and bid for target companies successfully. Financial market 
analysts can also benefit from an improved understanding permitted by these 
new tools for identifying potential targets and valuing companies in consolidat-
ing industries. When properly applied, we believe the strategic option perspec-
tive can promote rational decisions, help identify when takeover premiums for 
certain platform acquisitions are justified and clarify the relationships between 
the restructuring of fragmented markets and the strategies and market values of 
specific companies.
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